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Abstract
The question of whether females tend to act more ethically or risk-averse compared to males is an interesting ethical puzzle. 
Using a large sample of US firms over the 1992–2014 period, we investigate the effect that the gender of a chief executive 
officer (CEO) has on earnings management using classification shifting. We find that the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act 
period was characterized by high levels of classification shifting by both female and male CEOs, but the magnitude of such 
practices is, surprisingly, significantly higher in firms with female CEOs than in those with male CEOs. By contrast, our 
results suggest that following the passage of the punitive SOX Act, classification shifting by female CEOs declined sig-
nificantly, whilst it remained pervasive in firms with male CEOs. This suggests that the observable differences in financial 
reporting behavior between male and female CEOs seem to be because female CEOs are more risk-averse, but not necessar-
ily more ethically sensitive than their male counterparts are. The central tenets of our findings remain unchanged after several 
additional checks, including controlling for alternative earnings management techniques, corporate governance mechanisms, 
CEO and chief financial officer characteristics and propensity score-matching.
Keywords Female CEOs · Earnings quality · Classification shifting
Introduction
The introduction in the 1960s of a number of gender-focused 
equal opportunities laws, especially in developed coun-
tries, such as the 1963 Equal Pay Act of the US, helped in 
increasing women’s participation in the workforce (Khlif 
and Achek 2017). However, this did not necessarily lead 
to increased participation of women in senior management 
roles [e.g., board member or chief executive officer (CEO)] 
in companies, with ‘old-boys networks’ often cited as one 
of the major barriers to women’s executive career progres-
sion (Adams 2016). The past three decades have, however, 
witnessed significant increases in corporate, national and 
supra-national governance reforms, laws and affirmative ini-
tiatives explicitly aimed at increasing women’s participation 
in senior corporate executive roles (Adams 2016; Srinidhi 
et al. 2011). For instance, Canada, the EU, France, Norway, 
Italy and the UK have implemented either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ 
gender-based quotas for large corporate board memberships, 
which have led to observable increases in women’s presence 
on corporate boards in these countries (Adams 2016; Adams 
and Ferreira 2009; Srinidhi et al. 2011).
Discernibly, the strong push for gender-diverse corporate 
boards and executives is not only driven by ethical, moral 
and social fairness theories (Sun et al. 2017), but also eco-
nomic benefits of the unique skills, experiences and talents 
that women bring to such roles (Carter et al. 2003, 2010). 
Unsurprisingly, a number of distinct empirical strands of 
research have emerged. An earlier relevant strand has exam-
ined the effect that gender-diverse corporate boards and 
women CEOs have on firm performance/value (Carter et al. 
2003, 2010). With some exceptions (see Adams and Fer-
reira 2009; Kirsch 2017; Terjesen et al. 2009), the findings 
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suggest that gender has a positive effect on firm perfor-
mance/value (Carter et al. 2003; Gul et al. 2011; Liu et al. 
2014; Ntim 2015; Shrader et al. 1997).1 Such positive gender 
effects have been attributed to rational-economic inspired-
theories, such as agency, resource dependence, stakeholder 
and stewardship theories, which indicate that the presence 
of women in boardrooms enhances board independence, 
monitoring, advisory capacity and resources through greater 
connection of the firm to the external environment (Adams 
2016; Kirsch 2017; Terjesen et al. 2009).
A more recent strand of the literature has focused on 
the effect that gender-diverse corporate boards and women 
CEOs have on corporate fraud and wrong-doing (Ho et al. 
2015; Palvia et  al. 2015; Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Sun 
et al. 2017). For example, existing evidence indicates that 
the presence of women on corporate boards: (i) reduces 
the probability of corporate fraud (Capezio and  Mavi-
sakalyan 2016; Cumming et al. 2015), (ii) enhances earnings 
quality (Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Srinidhi et al. 2011; Zalata 
et al. 2018); and reduces the likelihood of financial statement 
re-statements (Abbott et al. 2012). Similarly, several findings 
suggest that executive female directors are associated with: 
(i) more conservative financial reporting (Ho et al. 2015; 
Palvia et al. 2015), (ii) higher accounting quality (Barua 
et al. 2010b), and (iii) lower fraudulent financial reporting 
(Sun et al. 2017). However, others have indicated that female 
auditors are less likely to issue a going-concern decision for 
financially distressed clients (Hossain et al. 2016). Unlike 
the performance-enhancing motives for appointing women, 
the preventive benefits of gender-diverse boards have been 
explained mainly by behavioral, psychological and social 
theories (Bernardi and Arnold 1997; Croson and Gneezy 
2009). For instance, women are perceived to be more ethi-
cal and risk-averse, and are generally more responsive to 
moral development (Bernardi and Arnold 1997; Croson and 
Gneezy 2009).
One problem with the existing accounting studies is that 
they often concurrently use these two theories to underpin 
these gender differences (i.e., Cumming et al. 2015; Ho et al. 
2015; Palvia et al. 2015; Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Sun et al. 
2017). First, gender might affect earnings management level 
because women seem to be more concerned with ethical 
issues and tend to act more ethically when facing a dilemma 
(Bernardi and Arnold 1997; Croson and Gneezy 2009). This 
can foster more honesty in financial reporting and potentially 
discourage earnings management (Ho et al. 2015; Peni and 
Vahamaa 2010).
Second, female directors tend to be more risk-averse 
(Croson and Gneezy 2009) and, therefore, are less likely 
to engage in aggressive earnings management (Peni and 
Vahamaa 2010; Srinidhi et al. 2011). Noticeably, the evi-
dence of women being more ethical and/or risk-averse leads 
to the same conclusion—that women are, on average, less 
likely to engage in earnings management than their male 
counterparts are (Palvia et al. 2015; Peni and Vahamaa 2010).
We contend that one reason for previous studies’ inabil-
ity to provide direct reasons for the differences between 
female and male directors’ opportunistic decisions might be 
their research design. In particular, past studies (Cumming 
et al. 2015; Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Sun et al. 2017) have 
focussed on accruals-based earnings management (AEM) 
that became a costly method rather than other, arguably 
less costly, methods, particularly after financial scandals in 
the early 2000s, such as Enron and WorldCom, which were 
followed by the issuance of some restrictive regulations, 
such as the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) (Chen et al. 2012; 
McNichols 2000; Stubben 2010). Accordingly, AEM has, 
arguably, become costly due to its detection cost (Abernathy 
et al. 2014; Alfonso et al. 2015), which in turn might lead 
managers to seek other earnings management methods that 
are relatively more difficult to detect if they hope to garner 
the benefit of earnings management (Abernathy et al. 2014; 
Lo 2008; Zalata and Roberts 2016, 2017).
A major question that has been investigated less often, 
however, is whether women executives are more ethical or 
risk-averse. A priori, if women are more risk-averse than 
ethical, then we conjecture that, when facing the possibility 
of costly legal action, they are more likely to shift to a more 
subtle, less risky and difficult-to-detect corporate activity 
(Abernathy et al. 2014; Alfonso et al. 2015), albeit equally 
un-ethical (Zalata and Roberts 2016, 2017). The opposite 
may hold if women are more ethical than men are. The 2002 
SOX Act and its associated regulations, such as ‘Regulation 
G’ offer a unique empirical setting to test these proposi-
tions. Following the introduction of SOX, AEM became 
extremely costly and risky for directors, with potentially 
lengthy prison terms and large personal financial penalties 
(Cohen et al. 2008; McNichols 2000; Stubben 2010; Zang 
2012). In this case, we argue that if female CEOs are more 
risk-averse, but not necessarily more ethical than men, then, 
they might change to less costly forms of earnings man-
agement, in this case, ‘classification shifting,’2 which is 
1 Gender has also been demonstrated to have a positive effect on 
other corporate outcomes, such as CSR (Mcguinness et  al. 2017), 
compensation (Baixauli-Soler et  al. 2016) and disclosure (Hughey 
and Sulkowski 2012).
2 We note, however, that the increased regulatory framework, such 
as SOX and ‘Regulation G’ along with greater focus by the US gov-
ernment, SEC, financial accounting standards board, analysts, audi-
tors, accounting bodies, investors, owners and directors on financial 
reporting during this period meant that the use of all forms of finan-
cial accounting manipulations (e.g., fraud, accruals-based earnings 
management, real earnings management and classification shifting) 
became costly and risky, and therefore it is likely that female CEOs’ 
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equally un-ethical,3 but difficult for enforcement authorities 
to detect (Abernathy et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2012; McNich-
ols 2000).
Unlike traditional fraudulent, accruals-based and real 
earnings management (REM), ‘classification shifting’ is a 
subtle form of earnings management that involves a deliber-
ate attempt at misclassifying the presentation of some core 
expenses as special expenses within the income statement 
(McVay 2006; Zalata and Roberts 2016, 2017). As classifi-
cation shifting4 is both less risky and un-ethical, but rarely 
studied (Abernathy et al. 2014; Alfonso et al. 2015), it allows 
us to make unique contributions to the existing literature by 
testing our propositions. Consequently, the main objective 
of this study is to investigate the effect that the gender of 
the CEO5 has on earnings management, using classification 
shifting. We focus on classification shifting since the extant 
literature (e.g., Fan et al. 2010; McVay 2006) has already 
documented that some firms use classification shifting to 
deceive investors, particularly when they are constrained 
from using accruals. In addition, Alfonso et al. (2015) show 
that investors tend to misprice underlying earnings that have 
been deliberately overstated by classification shifting, and 
thereby suggesting that investors, particularly small investors 
(Allee et al. 2007), can be at risk of being misled by clas-
sification shifters’ opportunistic practices.
Arguably, since classification shifting does not change the 
bottom-line net income, it is less likely to undergo scrutiny 
by regulators or external auditors than AEM might be (Aber-
nathy et al. 2014; McVay 2006). Furthermore, classification 
shifting involves neither accruals reversal in succeeding 
periods, nor the foregoing of returns or increased costs of 
real business management (Athanasakou et al. 2009; McVay 
2006). All these factors might suggest that earnings manage-
ment through classification shifting will incur lower costs 
than AEM or REM would (Zalata and Roberts 2016, 2017). 
Nevertheless, only few studies have investigated classifica-
tion shifting, and those that have done so, have suggested 
that firms employ it as a tool to meet their earnings’ tar-
gets, particularly in firms constrained from using accruals 
to inflate their earnings (e.g., Barua et al. 2010a; Fan et al. 
2010; Haw et al. 2011; McVay 2006). A major limitation 
of the few existing studies (Abernathy et al. 2014; Alfonso 
et al. 2015; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011; Zalata and 
Roberts 2016, 2017) is that they have often treated all CEOs 
engaged in classification shifting as the same, irrespective 
of their background, specifically their gender origins. Extant 
research has shown that CEOs’ reputation, financial exper-
tise, tenure, and age have an impact on their motivation 
and ability to engage in earnings management (i.e., Ali and 
Zhang 2015; Francis et al. 2008; Huang et al. 2012; Jiang 
et al. 2013). However, since the appointment of women in 
top executive positions is relatively low, we focus on CEOs 
gender. Whilst past studies (Arun et al. 2015; Barua et al. 
2010b; Cumming et al. 2015; Francis et al. 2015; Owhoso 
2002; Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Sun et al. 2011) have exam-
ined the effect that gender has on less sophisticated forms 
of earnings management, such as fraud and AEM, little, 
however, is known about whether there are gender differ-
ences in the use of such sophisticated and subtle earnings 
management techniques, such as classification shifting. The 
current study, therefore, seeks to extend prior studies by 
focussing on classification shifting. By so doing, we not only 
extend gender studies to a new territory, but also provide 
new insights with respect to the debate on whether female 
CEOs are really more ethical and/or risk-averse than their 
male counterparts are. In particular, we argue that if women 
are more risk-averse than ethical, then, they will readily 
shift to less risky and more sophisticated forms of earnings 
management methods—and in this case, ‘classification shift-
ing’—instead of the now highly risky, AEM, but which is 
nonetheless equally un-ethical. The opposite will be the case 
if women are more ethical than men are.
Using a sample of US firms from 1992 to 2014, we find 
that there are no significant differences between female and 
male CEOs in terms of classification shifting for the whole 
sample period. Interestingly, we find that the passage of 
SOX has an impact upon female CEOs’ preference towards 
classification shifting. In particular, we document that the 
pre-SOX period was characterized by increasing classifi-
cation shifting by both female and male CEOs, although 
this was more prominent in firms with female CEOs than 
in firms with male CEOs. Following the passage of SOX, 
3 Further, we note that during the spectacular corporate collapses 
of Enron, WorldCom and others in the early 2000s along with their 
major negative social and economic consequences, the un-ethical and 
immoral nature of all types of earnings management became easily 
self-evident among corporate executives, the media and the general 
public (Barua et al. 2010a; Bruns and Merchant 1990; Merchant and 
Rockness 1994).
4 Classification shifting is used to inflate core earnings or earnings 
before special items (Alfonso et  al. 2015; Haw et  al. 2011; McVay 
2006). Arguably, managers are motivated to inflate their core earn-
ings rather than the bottom-line net income because most investors 
currently base their investment decisions on this number (Bhattacha-
rya et al. 2007; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Elliott 2006). In addition, 
the extant research suggests that debt markets also pay more attention 
to this number (Dyreng et  al. 2016; Li 2010). This might motivate 
companies to engage in classification shifting.
5 In robustness checks, and following past evidence (Jiang et  al. 
2010), we control for the CFO’s gender and other gender-relevant 
characteristics of the CEO, as well as alternative earnings manage-
ment techniques, such as real earnings management.
ability to shift to or use classification shifting post-SOX became 
equally constrained (Abernathy et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2012).
Footnote 2 (continued)
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classification shifting by female CEOs (as risk-averse) 
declined significantly, whilst it became more pervasive in 
firms with male CEOs. This suggests that female CEOs do 
not consider classification shifting as a viable earnings man-
agement method after the passage of SOX, and therefore 
demonstrating that the strong legal environment appears to 
have affected their preference towards classification shift-
ing. Given this, our findings suggest that female CEOs are 
more risk-averse, but they are not necessarily more ethical 
than their male counterparts are.6 In addition, this study 
examined the impact of female CEOs upon classification 
shifting activities for a subset of firms that are more likely to 
have managed their earnings. Specifically, we undertook the 
analysis for two subsamples, namely, firms with CEOs hold-
ing high stock ownership and low-debt firms. The results 
of this analysis suggest that female CEOs had significantly 
higher classification shifting before the passage of SOX, 
whilst they used significantly less classification shifting in 
post-SOX. Together, our evidence demonstrates that differ-
ences between female and male CEOs in financial report-
ing decisions appear to be explained more by the fact that 
female CEOs are more risk-averse compared with their male 
counterparts, and less by the existing evidence that they are 
more ethical than men are. Thus, although women appear 
to be generally both more risk-averse and ethical than men, 
our evidence shows further that in a situation of extreme 
dilemma, their risk-aversion instinct is highly likely to take 
precedence over their ethical orientation.
This study contributes to the accounting literature in 
many ways. First, while the extant classification-shifting 
research focusses on neoclassical determinants of classifica-
tion shifting either at the firm (i.e., Zalata and Roberts 2016) 
or country (i.e., Haw et al. 2011) level, our paper seeks to 
relate CEOs’ gender to classification shifting. That is, our 
paper contributes to the earnings management literature 
by offering evidence for the first time that shows that the 
level of classification shifting is a function of CEOs’ gen-
der, particularly after considering the impact of the legal 
environment (i.e., the passage of SOX). Second, while most 
prior gender and ethics studies (Ibrahim and Angelidis 2009; 
Lund 2008; Owhoso 2002; Simga-Mugan et al. 2005) have 
used surveys to investigate whether females are more ethi-
cal than their male counterparts are, we extend them by 
using actual data relating to financial reporting. In contrast 
to these studies, our findings suggest that female CEOs are 
more risk-averse, but not necessarily more ethical than their 
male counterparts are. In this case, our paper provides new 
insights on the theoretical explanation underpinning the 
observable differences between female and male CEOs. In 
particular, it shows that while male CEOs see classification 
shifting as a viable earnings management method in pre- and 
post-SOX periods, female CEOs have reduced their use of 
this method after the passage of SOX. This result suggests 
that the differences in financial reporting behavior between 
male and female CEOs seem to be because female CEOs 
are more risk-averse, but not necessarily more ethical than 
their male counterparts are. Finally, the results of this study 
have implications for boards of directors in terms of inform-
ing their decisions regarding CEOs appointments; and for 
users of financial statements. Our findings suggest that they 
should consider not only the gender of CEOs, but also the 
legal environment as factors that can potentially influence 
the propensity for CEOs to manage earnings.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. “Litera-
ture Review and Hypotheses Development” section reviews 
the related literature and develops the main hypotheses. 
“Research Method” section describes the research design, 
and discusses the sample and data sources. “Results” section 
discusses the results, while “Conclusion” section concludes 
the study and discusses our study limitations.
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development
The number of female CEOs in top US firms is growing, 
although it is still far from reflective of the percentage of 
women in the workforce in general (Ho et al. 2015). For 
example, women currently hold about 4% of CEOs positions 
at S&P 500 companies compared with 2% in 2006 (Creswell 
2006). This increasing representation of women within the 
CEO ranks has motivated researchers to investigate whether 
female leaders have changed corporate behavior and attrib-
utes. Huang and Kisgen (2013) noted that it is important to 
investigate this research question, not only because it pro-
vides more insights into corporate behavior, but also because 
the representation of women in top executive positions con-
tinues to be relatively low.
6 As a mark of caution, our findings can also be interpreted to mean 
that the un-ethical nature of all forms of earnings management 
became more evident to corporate executives, including women 
executives during the major corporate collapses of the 2000s, such as 
Enron, that preceded the introduction of SOX (Abernathy et al. 2014; 
Chen et al. 2012). It is, therefore, possible that women did not view 
earnings management through the lens of ethical behavior until after 
these frauds that led to the passing of the SOX legislation occurred. 
Consequently, if women were to subsequently change their reporting 
behavior once they began to see earnings management as an ethical 
act following its publicity, then, it can be argued that differences in 
ethics between men and women could equally explain our current 
findings. Therefore, the reduction (increase) in the use of classifica-
tion shifting in firms with female (male) CEOs can also be ascribed 
to women being more ethically sensitive than men are. Our findings 
can, therefore, be attributed to or explained by the ethical theory as 
well. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possible 
alternative explanation of our findings to us. We have also discussed 
this possible alternative explanation of our findings, as part of the 
limitations in our concluding remarks.
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Extant research provides different theoretical explanations 
as to why women and men exhibit distinct business behav-
iors (Abbott et al. 2012; Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Srinidhi 
et al. 2011). In particular, researchers have identified two 
main factors that might drive the different business behav-
ior among women and men, namely attributes relating to 
their (i) ethical stands and (ii) risk preferences (Croson and 
Gneezy 2009; Palvia et al. 2015). This is important because 
these ethical attributes are central to the conceptualization 
of female leadership (Fine 2009; Ho et al. 2015). Despite 
the lack of a theoretical framework7 that can explain why 
women are more ethically sensitive than men (Collins 2000), 
the findings of a number of prior studies have suggested that 
women are more ethically sensitive than their male rivals 
are (i.e., Ibrahim and Angelidis 2009; Lund 2008; Owhoso 
2002; Simga-Mugan et al. 2005). In his review article, Col-
lins (2000) found that 32 studies out of 47 revealed that 
women are more ethically sensitive than men are. Ho et al. 
(2015) postulated that the stronger ethical nature of female 
leaders translates into stronger ethical leadership, and hence 
a more ethical work climate, which can foster greater lev-
els of honesty in financial reporting, and thereby potentially 
discouraging earnings management. However, most eth-
ics studies (Ibrahim and Angelidis 2009; Lund 2008) base 
their analysis on data collected from surveys often with low 
response rates, which thus might cast doubt on the valid-
ity of their inferences. Apart from the low response rates 
(Owhoso 2002), respondents may not accurately report their 
ethical actions (Simga-Mugan et al. 2005), and therefore 
these studies arguably need to be backed by evidence from 
actual archival data (Ho et al. 2015; Palvia et al. 2015).
Another strand of studies (Croson and Gneezy 2009; Fac-
cio et al. 2016; Martin et al. 2009) has investigated gender 
impact on risk aversion and indicates that female execu-
tives are more risk-averse than male executives are. Byrnes 
et al. (1999), for example, reviewed 150 psychology stud-
ies and found that female participants are less likely than 
male participants to take risk. Prior studies have also shown 
that this risk attitude is prevalent in accounting, economics, 
finance and management decisions (Barua et al. 2010b; Cro-
son and Gneezy 2009). For example, in their experimental 
study, Powell and Ansic (1997) found that females tend to 
avoid making risky financial decisions compared to their 
male counterparts. Martin et al. (2009) observed significant 
reductions in risk levels following female CEO appointments 
compared with male CEO appointments. Faccio et al. (2016) 
showed that firms with female CEOs have lower leverage, 
less volatile earnings and a higher chance of survival than 
do firms with male CEOs. Furthermore, Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) found that female CEOs are more cautious when 
making financial decisions; in particular, they found that 
firms with female CEOs grow more slowly, are less likely 
to make acquisitions, and are less likely to issue debt. All 
these appear to suggest that female CEOs tend to avoid tak-
ing risky decisions. However, Atkinson et al. (2003) found 
no significant differences between male and female CEOs 
in terms of risk-taking.
Based on these different attributes between women and 
men, the extant research has investigated whether female 
CEOs bring different values to their firms compared with 
their male counterparts; for example, Carter et al. (2003, 
2010), Francoeur et al. (2008) and Welbourne et al. (2007) 
found that the presence of female executives in top man-
agement has a positive association with their firms’ per-
formance. However, this improved performance can be 
achieved through better operating decisions and work envi-
ronment or through opportunistic financial reporting deci-
sions or earnings management. Earnings management is 
one of the key ethical issues and raises the most important 
ethical dilemmas facing corporate executives (Bruns and 
Merchant 1990; Merchant and Rockness 1994; Sun et al. 
2011). However, while there has been a dearth of studies 
investigating whether executive directors’ gender affects 
their willingness to engage in earnings management, the 
extant literature, discussed in detail below, shows, to some 
extent, a low propensity of female directors to engage in 
earnings management (Ho et al. 2015; Palvia et al. 2015).
Whilst Ge et al. (2011) and Ye et al. (2010) failed to 
support this proposition, some other studies document sig-
nificant differences between male and female executives 
on financial reporting quality (Capezio and  Mavisakalyan 
2016; Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Srinidhi et al. 2011). For 
example, Francis et al. (2014) showed that female execu-
tives are associated with less tax aggressiveness. Similarly, 
Francis et al. (2015) and Ho et al. (2015) showed that female 
executives are more conservative in their financial report-
ing than their male counterparts are. In terms of earnings 
management, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) found that the 
presence of female executives within the top management 
level is positively related to earnings quality or low earnings 
management. In supporting this, Barua et al. (2010b) found 
that firms with female chief financial officers (CFOs) have 
lower AEM. Focussing on blatant cases of manipulation, 
Cumming et al. (2015) showed that the probability of fraud 
is lower in firms with more female representatives. However, 
Arun et al. (2015) reported that female directors constrain 
upward AEM and encourage downward earnings manage-
ment. Nonetheless, the role of gender differences in secur-
ing the integrity of financial reports is not fully understood 
7 Note though that females often depict certain characteristics, such 
as being less aggressive, assertive, competitive and overconfident, 
but more anxious, cautious, collaborative, risk-averse, emotional and 
socially responsive than males; all qualities that, in theory, are likely 
to arguably compel women to act more ethically in a given ethical 
dilemma than men would (Croson and Gneezy 2009; Ho et al. 2015).
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(Barua et al. 2010b; Ho et al. 2015), and the extant research 
is yet to provide a direct explanation for why female CEOs 
are less likely to engage in earnings management than their 
male counterparts are.8
Furthermore, prior studies (Cumming et al. 2015; Peni 
and Vahamaa 2010; Sun et al. 2017) have investigated the 
relationship between female CEOs and AEM that, arguably, 
has higher potential litigation and reputation costs because 
of the intense public and regulatory scrutiny (Abbott et al. 
2012), particularly after the financial scandals in 2000 
(Barua et al. 2010b; Bruns and Merchant 1990; Merchant 
and Rockness 1994). Consequently, we argue that if female 
CEOs are more risk-averse than ethical, then they may 
be less inclined to engage in AEM largely because of the 
significant associated risk. By contrast, when they are not 
affected by either regulation or litigation risk, they perhaps 
might equally use earnings management, but a more subtle/
sophisticated one to outperform the market if female CEOs 
are equally un-ethically oriented, as their male counterparts 
are.9 As such, classification shifting arguably provides a 
powerful setting to investigate this proposition. Unlike 
AEM, classification shifting is not related to the measure-
ment or recognition of items (Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 
2011); rather it is related to the appropriate categorization of 
expenses within the income statement (McVay 2006; Zalata 
and Roberts 2016). The appropriate categorization is sub-
ject to high managerial discretion, and therefore regulators 
and external monitors might have limited ability to verify it 
(Zalata and Roberts 2017), leading to lower litigation and 
reputation concerns (or low risk) than concerns about AEM 
(Alfonso et al. 2015; McVay 2006).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no cases, where 
CEOs have been sued for engaging in classification shifting 
to-date (Zalata and Roberts 2016, 2017). Consequently, in 
such a relatively low-risk setting (Abernathy et al. 2014; 
Alfonso et al. 2015), it is reasonable to expect a different 
behavior of female CEOs (they might manage their earn-
ings using classification shifting to a higher extent than 
male CEOs would; or at least at the same level), if they 
do have the willingness to manage earnings in order to 
influence financial performance, as male CEOs tend to do 
(Barua et al. 2010b; Croson and Gneezy 2009). In addition, 
investigating the impact of gender on classification shifting 
would provide more direct evidence on whether the different 
behaviors between female and male CEOs in terms of earn-
ings management is because females are more risk-averse, 
but not necessarily more ethical than male CEOs are. For 
example, if this study was to find a negative relationship 
between female CEOs and classification shifting (despite 
its lower risk), this might demonstrate that female direc-
tors are more ethically sensitive than male directors are. On 
the other hand, if there is a positive relationship, the risk-
aversion theory might represent the best theory to explain 
female CEO behavior. Given that both our risk-aversion and 
ethical theories imply that female CEOs are, on average, less 
likely to engage in earnings management than male CEOs, 
including classification shifting, our first hypothesis is set 
up as follows:
Hypothesis 1 Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative 
relationship between female CEOs and the extent of clas-
sification shifting.
The extant literature has evaluated the economic conse-
quences of the SOX, which represents one of the most influ-
ential reforms of American business practices in a century 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Apparently, SOX has increased 
litigation risks and costs because of high possibility of law-
suits that can include a prison term of 25 years and a per-
sonal fine of US$15 million for corporate executives if con-
victed. However, subsequent to the passage of SOX, prior 
studies showed that firms tended to switch from the highly 
risky AEM technique to a less costly method—namely, REM 
(i.e., Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 
2012). Therefore, the current study seeks to extend prior 
accounting studies by investigating whether SOX affects 
firms’ preference towards classification shifting and whether 
the ethical disposition of female CEOs affects this relation-
ship. Because of the increased cost of AEM (Cohen et al. 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010), CEOs might resort to clas-
sification shifting, which is a subtle and difficult-to-detect 
form of earnings management. In that case, we will expect 
to witness an increase in the use of classification shifting 
and particularly by highly risk-averse, but not necessarily 
more ethical than female CEOs (as a less costly earnings 
management method) post-SOX.
On the other hand, SOX has affected the disclosure 
requirement of core earnings. Heflin and Hsu (2008) found 
that SOX has affected core-earnings reporting, and there-
fore the likelihood of detecting it has become potentially 
high in post-SOX era. In addition, since external auditors 
has become more concerned about classification shifting 
practices (Abernathy et al. 2014), especially in the post-
SOX era (Chen et al. 2012), female CEOs may not view it 
as a viable method in the post-SOX era. Abernathy et al.’s 
8 We note, however, that our goal is not to provide an explanation as 
to why female CEOs are less likely to engage in earnings manage-
ment than their male counterparts are. Instead, our goal is to simply 
show that women behave differently in the post-SOX period with one 
method for earnings management (i.e., classification shifting). More 
conclusive evidence can be offered by future researchers by using dif-
ferent earnings management techniques, such as accruals, classifica-
tion shifting and real earnings management methods, and ideally set 
up within both risk and ethical settings.
9 It should, however, be noted the opposite case will equally be 
expected to hold if female CEOs are more ethical than male CEOs.
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(2014) findings did not support this proposition; however, 
they did not differentiate between male and female CEOs. 
If female CEOs are more ethically sensitive than their male 
counterparts are, then, we should not expect SOX to affect 
their attitude towards classification shifting. On the other 
hand, if female CEOs are more risk-averse than male CEOs 
are, then, SOX should be expected to affect their behavior 
towards classification shifting because of the increased dis-
closure requirement and potential lawsuit filing (Chen et al. 
2012). Given these conflicting theoretical arguments, we do 
not predict a sign for the relationship between female CEOs 
and classification shifting in the post-SOX era, with our final 
hypothesis set up as follows:
Hypothesis 2 Ceteris paribus, there is a significant relation-
ship between female CEOs and the extent of classification 
shifting after the passage of SOX.
Research Method
Empirical Models
To investigate whether the gender of CEOs affects the level 
of classification shifting, which is a more sophisticated, 
but potentially less litigious form of earnings management 
(Abernathy et al. 2014), this study focusses on the deliberate 
misclassification of core expenses, as special items within 
the income statement (McVay 2006). Consequently, we test 
the association between unexpected core earnings and spe-
cial items. We follow McVay (2006) in developing a proxy 
for normal core earnings being a function of last year’s core 
earnings, current and last years’ accruals, asset turnover, 
and changes in sales, and negative sales. However, since 
the inclusion of current year’s accruals might introduce a 
mechanical relationship between special items and unex-
pected core earnings, we follow Fan et al.’s (2010) recom-
mendation and adjust McVay’s (2006) model. In particular, 
we exclude current year’s accruals from the McVay (2006) 
expectation model as follows:
The variables in the above equation are measured as 
follows:
CE Core earnings/sales. Where core earn-
ings equals (sales − cost of goods 
sold − selling, general, and adminis-
trative expenses)
(1)
CE
i,t = 훾0 + 훾1CEi,t−1 + 훾2ATOi,t + 훾3ACCRUALSi,t−1
+ 훾4ΔSALESi,t + 훾5NEG_ΔSALESi,t + ui,t.
ATO Asset turnover, defined as sales/
average net operating assets, where 
net operating assets is the differ-
ence between operating assets and 
operating liabilities. Operating 
assets = total assets − cash and 
cash equivalent. Operating liabili-
ties = total assets − total debt − book 
value of common equity − preferred 
equity − minority interests
Accruals Working capital accruals measured as 
(change in total current assets net 
of change in cash minus change in 
current liabilities net of change in the 
current portion of long-term debt)/ 
sales
∆Sales Change in sales = (salest − salest−1)/
salest−1
NEG_Sales This refers to ∆sales if it is negative, 
and zero otherwise
We estimate Model (1) cross-sectionally by industry and 
fiscal year in order to obtain variable coefficients that we 
use to calculate expected core earnings. We then calculate 
the expected core earnings for each firm by multiplying the 
coefficients obtained from Model (1) by the actual value of 
variables in the equation for each firm. We then estimate the 
following model to investigate whether CEOs’ gender affects 
the level of firms’ classification shifting,
 where unexpected core earnings (UCE) is the difference 
between reported core earnings and expected core earnings. 
Consistent with McVay (2006) and Fan et al. (2010), SPI is spe-
cial items as a percentage of sales. Special items are multiplied 
by − 1, when special items are income-decreasing and are set 
to 0, when they are income-increasing. FCEO is a dummy vari-
able that is equal to 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise.
Classification shifting increases both core earnings and 
special items and, therefore, when firms engage in such 
practices, β1 should be positive.10 That is, the association 
between UCE and SPI is the aspect that suggests clas-
sification shifting (Zalata and Roberts 2017). In order to 
(2)
UCE = 훽0 + 훽1SPI + 훽2FCEO + 훽3SPI × FCEO + Control variables,
10 Nevertheless, this positive relationship might be due to real 
improvement in firms’ core profitability because of restructuring 
activities or other real economic events that drive this SPI. Therefore, 
following McVay (2006), to mitigate this concern, we investigate 
whether this improved profitability persists into the subsequent year. 
The reversal of this improvement in profitability will be more consist-
ent with classification shifting. In this case, we should find a negative 
association between the current year’s SPI and the unexpected change 
in core earnings in the subsequent year. Consistent with classification 
shifting behavior, our unreported results show a negative relationship 
between SPI and the unexpected change in firms’ core profitability, 
which supports a classification-shifting behavior.
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investigate Hypothesis 1, we therefore include the interac-
tions between SPI and FCEO and expect it to be significant. 
In addition, the current study controls for firms’ characteris-
tics that can affect the level of earnings management.
Zalata and Roberts (2017) suggested that variables that 
might affect the level of earnings management include firm 
size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), operating cash flow (OCF), 
return on assets (ROA), and market-to-book value ratio 
(MBV). Where SIZE is measured as the natural log of 
total assets. LEV is measured as ratio of long-term debt to 
equity.  OCF is measured as the cash flows from operations 
scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as the net 
income divided by average total assets. MBV is measured 
as market capitalization scaled by book value of common 
equity. In addition, Haw et al. (2011) show that the use of 
a Big4 auditor might affect firms’ preference towards clas-
sification shifting and therefore, we control for Big4 auditors 
(AUDIT). AUDIT is an indicator variable set to one if a 
Big4 auditor audits a firm, and zero otherwise. Additionally, 
we control for CEO age (CEOAGE).
In order to investigate whether the legal environment 
affects CEOs’ behavior towards classification shifting, we 
model Eq. 3, and add SOX as a proxy for the change in 
the legal environment. SOX is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if the fiscal year-end is in post-SOX era, and 
zero otherwise.
The regression model takes the following form:
To investigate our hypothesis, we focus on the coefficients 
of β1, β4, β5 and β7.
Sample Selection and Data Sources
Financial statement data are obtained for the years 1992 to 
2014 from the 2014 Annual Compustat File.11 CEO gender 
and shareholding data are obtained from ExecuComp. Each 
firm-year observation is required to have sufficient data to 
calculate variables in Model (1). Since financial firms have a 
different financial reporting environment, we excluded them 
from our sample. Similar to prior classification-shifting stud-
ies, in order to ensure sufficient data to estimate normal core 
earnings, we exclude industries with less than eight firm-
year observations. After calculating unexpected core earn-
ings, we then merge the financial data with the CEO gender 
data and we delete observations with missing CEO gender 
(3)
UCE = 훽
0
+ 훽
1
SPI + 훽
2
FCEO + 훽
3
SOX + 훽
4
SPI × FCEO
+ 훽
5
SPI × SOX + 훽
6
FCEO × SOX + 훽
7
SPI
× FCEO × SOX + Control variables.
and control variables’ data. The resulting sample with full 
data is 21,101 firm-year observations, spanning the period 
from 1992 to 2014.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of unexpected core 
earnings (UCE), special items (SPI), female CEOs (FCEO) 
and other variables used in the analysis. For each variable, 
we report the mean, the median, standard deviation, and the 
25th and 75th percentiles. The mean of unexpected core 
earnings (UCE) as a percentage of sales is 0.03 and the 
median is 0.00. The mean of special items as a percentage 
of sales is 0.02 and the median is equal to 0.00. Observ-
ably, only 3% of our sample employs women as CEOs.12 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix between all variables. 
It shows a significant positive relationship between SPI 
and UCE, suggesting that some firms might have misclas-
sified some core expenses as special items. In general, the 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
UCE unexpected core earnings, FCEO indicator variable set to one 
if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to 
one if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE 
the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio of long-term debt to 
total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total 
assets, ROA return on assets measured as net income divided by aver-
age total assets, MBV market to book value ratio measured as mar-
ket capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT 
indicator variable set to one if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero 
otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, SPI special items as a percentage of 
sales  (Special items are multiplied by − 1, where special items are 
income-decreasing, and are set to 0 where special items are income-
increasing)
Variables Mean Median Standard 
deviation
25% 75%
UCE 0.03 0 0.23 − 0.05 0.06
SPI 0.02 0 0.07 0 0.02
FCEO 0.03 0 0.16 0 0
SOX 0.65 1 0.48 0 1
SIZE 7.09 6.93 1.54 5.96 8.08
LEV 0.55 0.28 1.45 0 0.69
OCF 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.06 0.17
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.1
MBV 3.13 2.27 3.59 1.42 3.71
AUDIT 0.93 1 0.25 1 1
CEOAGE 53.53 55 11.91 50 60
11 Note that 1992 is the earliest year for which the required data is 
available in the Execucomp database.
12 In particular, in our current sample, a total of 579 firm-year obser-
vations have female CEOs, of which 142 belong to the pre-SOX era.
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correlation matrix does not show any potential serious mul-
ticollinearity problems.
Multivariate Analyses
To investigate female CEOs’ preference towards classifi-
cation shifting (Hypothesis 1), we focus on the coefficient 
of SPI and interaction between SPI and FCEO. The results 
presented in Table 3 under Model (1) show that the coef-
ficient of SPI is positive and significant at 1%, suggesting 
that male CEOs might have misclassified some core items 
as special items within the income statement, and therefore 
might have inflated their core profitability. The variable of 
interest, SPI × FCEO, is positive, but insignificant, demon-
strating that there is no significant difference between male 
and female CEOs in terms of their preference towards clas-
sification shifting as a more sophisticated, but less litigious 
earnings management method.
Nevertheless, the previous analysis focusses on the whole 
sample period and ignores the fact that the SOX Act might 
have affected CEOs’ opportunistic behavior. Cohen et al. 
(2008) showed that the passage of SOX has increased the 
cost of AEM and, therefore, opportunistic firms might shift 
to another earnings management method that has a lower 
detection cost. In these circumstances, classification shifting 
might represent a viable method. Therefore, we extended 
the analysis to investigate the impact of SOX on female 
CEOs’ preference towards classification shifting. To inves-
tigate this research question, we created an interaction term 
among SOX, SPI and FCEO. The results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 3 under Models (2) and (3). In general, 
our results reported under Model (2) show that while SPI is 
still positive and significant at 1%, SPI × SOX is also posi-
tive and significant at 5%, suggesting that increased regula-
tion surrounding financial reporting in the post-SOX era has 
increased firms’ preference towards classification shifting; 
this may be because of its lower detection cost compared 
with other earnings management methods. Furthermore, 
Table 3, under Model (3), reports the results when consid-
ering the differences between male and female CEOs in the 
pre- and post-SOX eras. SPI is still positive and significant 
at 1%, suggesting that some male CEOs used to employ clas-
sification shifting before the SOX. In addition, it shows that 
SPI × SOX is positive and significant at 1%, suggesting that 
male CEOs increased their use of classification shifting, par-
ticularly in the post-SOX era. Interestingly, the coefficient 
on SPI × FCEO is positive and significant at 5%, suggesting 
that classification shifting was more prevalent in firms with 
female CEOs in the pre-SOX period than in firms with their 
male counterparts.
On the other hand, Table 3 [under Model (3)] shows that 
the coefficient on the variable of interest, SPI × FCEO × SOX, 
is negative and significant at 1%, demonstrating that clas-
sification shifting has become less prominent in firms with 
female CEOs after the passage of SOX. This suggests that 
a strong legal environment affects the preference of female 
CEOs towards classification shifting. That is, female CEOs 
used to engage in classification shifting before the passage 
of SOX, after which they have significantly reduced their use 
of the classification shifting. Again, these results support the 
proposition that female CEOs are more risk-averse than male 
Table 2  Correlation matrix
UCE unexpected core earnings, FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one if 
firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio of long-term debt to total equity, OCF 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV 
market to book value ratio measured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one if a 
Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, SPI special Items as a percentage of sales (Special items are multiplied by − 1, 
where special items are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 where special items are income-increasing)
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables UCE SPI FCEO SOX SIZE LEV OCF ROA MBV AUDIT CEOAGE
UCE 1
SPI 0.13*** 1
FCEO − 0.01 − 0.00 1
SOX 0.00 − 0.03*** 0.05*** 1
SIZE − 0.01* − 0.03*** − 0.01* 0.18*** 1
LEV − 0.01 0.03*** − 0.01* − 0.01 0.16*** 1
OCF − 0.12*** − 0.21*** 0.01 0.00 0.06*** − 0.08*** 1
ROA − 0.15*** − 0.58*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.12*** − 0.07*** 0.64*** 1
MBV − 0.07*** − 0.04*** − 0.00 − 0.05*** 0.01 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 1
AUDIT − 0.02** − 0.01 − 0.02** − 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 1
CEOAGE − 0.01 − 0.08*** − 0.03*** 0.11*** 0.11*** − 0.00 0.04*** 0.10*** − 0.03*** − 0.02*** 1
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CEOs, but not necessarily more ethically sensitive than their 
male counterparts are.
So far, the reported analysis under Table 3 focusses on 
all firms. However, McVay (2006) and Zalata and Roberts 
(2017) noted that only some firms are able to deliberately 
misclassify their core expenses. In particular, they argue that 
firms with special expenses are more able to engage in clas-
sification shifting than other firms are. Hence, compared 
with the full sample analysis, limiting our analysis to only 
firms with special expenses (12,169 firm-year observations) 
might provide more powerful analysis because these firms 
have greater opportunity to engage in classification shifting; 
we report the results of this analysis in Table 4. Consist-
ent with our previous analysis, Table 4, under Model (3), 
still shows that both male and female CEOs used to view 
classification shifting as a viable earnings management 
method before the passage of SOX. In particular, it shows 
that the coefficients on SPI (male CEOs before SOX) and 
SPI × FCEO (female CEOs before SOX) are positive and sig-
nificant at 1 and 5%, respectively. It seems that male CEOs 
increased their use of classification shifting in the post-SOX 
era (SPI × SOX), demonstrating that when the cost of AEM 
becomes high (e.g., because of SOX), male CEOs might 
seek another earnings management method that has a lower 
detection cost—such as classification shifting.
Interestingly, our results still suggest that the passage of 
SOX affected the behavior of female CEOs differently. In 
particular, it shows that classification shifting has become 
less prominent in firms with female CEOs in the post-
SOX era (SPI × FCEO × SOX) than in the pre-SOX era 
(SPI × FCEO). All these findings suggest that female CEOs 
are more risk-averse than male CEOs are, and therefore they 
Table 3  The association 
between female CEOs and 
classification shifting (all firms)
We estimate the parameters using the following model
UCE = β0 + β1SPI + β2FCEO + β3SOX + β4SPI × FCEO + β5SPI × SOX + β6FCEO × SOX + β7SPI × FCEO 
× SOX + Control variables
Where
FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one 
if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return 
on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV market to book value ratio meas-
ured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one 
if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, SPI special Items as a percentage 
of sales (Special items are multiplied by − 1, where special items are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 
where special items are income-increasing)
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
SPI 0.293 9.37*** 0.220 5.12*** 0.209 4.85***
FCEO − 0.009 − 0.87 − 0.009 − 0.88 0.008 0.36
SOX 0.024 2.09** 0.024 2.12**
SPI × FCEO 0.030 0.19 0.010 0.06 0.749 2.41**
SPI × SOX 0.124 2.5** 0.143 2.85***
FCEO × SOX − 0.022 − 0.93
SPI × FCEO × SOX − 0.994 − 2.77***
SIZE 0.000 0.02 0.000 − 0.01 0.000 0
LEV 0.001 0.4 0.000 0.32 0.000 0.34
OCF − 0.114 − 5.36*** − 0.115 − 5.38*** − 0.114 − 5.34***
ROA − 0.132 − 5.6*** − 0.133 − 5.64*** − 0.133 − 5.66***
MBV − 0.003 − 5.43*** − 0.003 − 5.32*** − 0.003 − 5.32***
AUDIT − 0.008 − 1.17 − 0.008 − 1.14 − 0.008 − 1.15
CEOAGE 0.000 0.76 0.000 0.7 0.000 0.69
_CONS 0.054 3.83*** 0.054 3.81*** 0.053 3.79***
YEARS Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
F 23.97 23.41 22.26
No. of observations 21,101 21,101 21,101
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reduced their use of classification shifting after the passage 
of SOX. However, our analysis does not support the propo-
sition that female CEOs are more ethically sensitive than 
male CEOs; otherwise, they would not have inflated their 
core earnings using classification shifting before SOX, on 
average, at a higher level than their male CEOs.
Robustness Analyses
First, the previous evidence of classification shifting was 
based on McVay’s (2006) expectation model after modify-
ing it following Fan et al. (2010). However, an alternative 
approach to dealing with the inherent bias associated with 
McVay’s model is to re-estimate unexpected core earnings 
(UCE) by replacing total accruals with working capital 
accruals, which do not include depreciation expense and 
other special-items accruals; this therefore mitigates any 
bias in McVay’s model (Athanasakou et al. 2009; Haw 
et al. 2011). Therefore, as robustness analysis, UCE is 
re-estimated by incorporating both current and lag work-
ing capital accruals in the expectation model. Using this 
approach, unreported results support our reported findings 
under the main analysis.
Second, the extant research shows that some firms have 
higher incentives to manage earnings than others do and, 
therefore, in order to increase the power of the results, 
we repeat our analysis using a sample of firms that have a 
strong motivation to manage earnings. Prior studies (for 
example, Baker et al. 2003; Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Kuang 2008; McAnally 
et al. 2008) have showed that CEOs with high stock own-
ership tend to engage more in earnings management in 
Table 4  The association 
between female CEOs and 
classification shifting (firms 
with income-decreasing SPI)
We estimate the parameters using the following model
UCE = β0 + β1SPI + β2FCEO + β3SOX + β4SPI × FCEO + β5SPI × SOX + β6FCEO × SOX + β7SPI × FCEO 
× SOX + Control variables
Where
FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one 
if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return 
on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV market to book value ratio meas-
ured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one 
if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, SPI special items as a percentage 
of sales (Special items are multiplied by − 1, where special items are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 
where special items are income-increasing)
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
SPI 0.324 8.55*** 0.230 4.5*** 0.218 4.24***
FCEO 0.004 0.3 0.004 0.32 − 0.007 − 0.19
SOX 0.028 1.43 0.028 1.42
SPI × FCEO − 0.058 − 0.34 − 0.083 − 0.48 0.799 2.17**
SPI × SOX 0.155 2.73*** 0.175 3.07***
FCEO × SOX 0.009 0.25
SPI × FCEO × SOX − 1.155 − 2.76***
SIZE − 0.003 − 1.64* − 0.003 − 1.68* − 0.003 − 1.68*
LEV 0.0003 0.2 0.0001 0.09 0.0002 0.12
OCF − 0.201 − 6.4*** − 0.203 − 6.46*** − 0.201 − 6.4***
ROA − 0.079 − 2.4** − 0.080 − 2.42** − 0.081 − 2.45**
MBV − 0.003 − 3.51*** − 0.003 − 3.38*** − 0.003 − 3.38***
AUDIT − 0.003 − 0.33 − 0.002 − 0.25 − 0.003 − 0.26
CEOAGE 0.000 0.13 0.000 0.07 0.000 0.06
_CONS 0.061 2.63*** 0.064 2.72*** 0.064 2.74***
YEARS Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.04 0.04 0.04
F 17.60 17.28 16.49
No. of observations 12,169 12,169 12,169
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order to increase the value of their stocks.13 That is, in this 
sample, female CEOs with high stock ownership might 
exhibit different behavior towards classification shifting, 
and therefore we might find no significant differences in 
female CEOs’ preference towards classification shifting, 
in the pre- and post-SOX periods. In order to test this 
conjecture, we repeat our analysis using a subsample of 
firms with high CEO stock ownership. A firm is classified 
as ‘high’ stock ownership if its CEO’s stock-ownership 
percentage is more than the sample median. Focussing on 
these firms, our reported results in Table 5 are qualitatively 
similar to that reported under the main analysis.
Third, the extant research shows that there are differ-
ences between high- and low-debt firms in terms of their 
preferences towards earnings management (i.e., DeAngelo 
et al. 1994; Jaggi and Lee 2002; Peltier-Rivest 1999; Saleh 
and Ahmed 2005). Since highly leveraged firms are scruti-
nized closely, they have less ability to deceive the market 
by inflating their reported earnings and, instead, they might 
engage in downward earnings management. That is, since 
the focus of our paper is on upward earnings management 
Table 5  The association 
between female CEOs and 
classification shifting (firms 
with high stock ownership 
firms)
We estimate the parameters using the following model
UCE = β0 + β1SPI + β2FCEO + β3SOX + β4SPI × FCEO + β5SPI × SOX + β6FCEO × SOX + β7SPI × FCEO 
× SOX + Control variables
Where
FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one 
if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return 
on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV market to book value ratio meas-
ured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one 
if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, SPI special Items as a percentage 
of sales (Special items are multiplied by − 1, where special items are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 
where special items are income-increasing)
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
SPI 0.317 7.11*** 0.141 2.28** 0.119 1.92*
FCEO − 0.027 − 2.04** − 0.027 − 2.05** − 0.032 − 1.14
SOX 0.014 0.93 0.014 0.92
SPI × FCEO − 0.283 − 1.42 − 0.342 − 1.71* 1.326 2.95***
SPI × SOX 0.292 4.08*** 0.334 4.61***
FCEO × SOX 0.003 0.09
SPI × FCEO × SOX − 2.084 − 4.15***
SIZE − 0.006 − 3*** − 0.006 − 2.94*** − 0.006 − 2.99***
LEV 0.001 0.32 0.0003 0.19 0.0004 0.24
OCF − 0.092 − 3.3*** − 0.093 − 3.37*** − 0.094 − 3.39***
ROA − 0.115 − 3.72*** − 0.118 − 3.79*** − 0.114 − 3.69***
MBV − 0.005 − 6.18*** − 0.004 − 5.98*** − 0.004 − 5.97***
AUDIT − 0.002 − 0.32 − 0.002 − 0.3 − 0.003 − 0.35
CEOAGE 0.001 3.27*** 0.001 3.22*** 0.001 3.23***
_CONS 0.046 2.3** 0.044 2.2** 0.045 2.25**
YEARS Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.04
F 13.11 13.24 12.98
No. of observations 10,556 10,556 10,556
13 In addition, prior studies suggest that firms use classification shift-
ing to report earnings growth (or avoid reporting earnings decrease) 
(see for example, Barua et al. 2010a). Therefore, we repeat our main 
analysis using a sample of firms that might have met their growth 
target. In this sample, we may find that female CEOs might have 
engaged in classification shifting at the same levels as male CEOs 
did. That is, we start this analysis by determining firms that have 
met their earnings growth target. Following Barua et al. (2010a), we 
classify firms as engaging in earnings decreasing avoidance, if they 
reported increase in their operating earnings per share. Using this 
sample, our unreported results moderately support our main findings 
before the introduction of SOX, and significantly support our post-
SOX findings.
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using classification shifting, we expect to find our results to 
be more pronounced in low-leverage firms. In order to test 
this conjecture, we repeat our analysis using a subsample 
of low-debt firms. A firm is classified as a low-debt firm if 
its long-term debt-to-equity ratio is lower than the sample 
median. We then repeat our analysis for this subsample sepa-
rately. The results for this analysis are reported in Table 6, 
and are qualitatively similar to those reported under the main 
analysis.
Fourth, under the main analysis, we found that female 
CEOs are less likely to engage in classification shifting in 
the post-SOX era than in the pre-SOX era. However, these 
results might be driven by missing variables. In particular, 
prior research suggests that corporate governance mecha-
nisms, such as institutional shareholders play a key external 
monitoring role that reduces managers’ opportunistic behav-
ior (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003). Similarly, blockholders 
have more to lose if their companies have engaged in oppor-
tunistic financial reporting decisions, and therefore we 
expect that the presence of such investors would strengthen 
a firm’s corporate governance structure (Cyert et al. 2002; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1986). In addition, the length of ten-
ure might affect the ability of a CEO to influence a firm’s 
financial reporting decisions (Ali and Zhang 2015). Finally, 
the CFO might affect firms’ financial reporting decisions as 
well (Barua et al. 2010b; Jiang et al. 2010) and, therefore, 
CFO gender might affect classification shifting. That is, as a 
robustness test, we extend our control variables to include a 
number of additional corporate governance, CEO and CFO 
characteristics, including percentage of institutional owner-
ship (INSTOWN), the presence of blockholders (BLOCK), 
CEOs’ tenure (CEOTEN) and CFO gender (FCFO), where 
INSTOWN is measured as the number of shares held 
by institutional shareholders divided by the number of 
Table 6  The association 
between female CEOs and 
classification shifting (low-
leverage firms)
We estimate the parameters using the following model
UCE = β0 + β1SPI + β2FCEO + β3SOX + β4SPI × FCEO + β5SPI × SOX + β6FCEO × SOX + β7SPI × FCEO 
× SOX + Control variables
Where
FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one 
if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return 
on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV market to book value ratio meas-
ured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one 
if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, SPI special items as a percentage 
of sales (Special items are multiplied by − 1, where special items are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 
where special items are income-increasing)
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
SPI 0.248 5.54*** 0.050 0.86 0.027 0.46
FCEO − 0.021 − 1.56 − 0.022 − 1.61 − 0.009 − 0.35
SOX 0.009 0.52 0.010 0.55
SPI × FCEO 0.127 0.66 0.057 0.3 1.225 3.39***
SPI × SOX 0.373 5.35*** 0.415 5.88***
FCEO × SOX − 0.019 − 0.63
SPI × FCEO × SOX − 1.629 − 3.82***
SIZE − 0.001 − 0.55 − 0.001 − 0.46 − 0.001 − 0.43
LEV 0.006 1.82* 0.007 1.99** 0.007 2.07**
OCF − 0.117 − 4*** − 0.119 − 4.06*** − 0.116 − 3.98***
ROA − 0.176 − 5.59*** − 0.176 − 5.61*** − 0.178 − 5.68***
MBV − 0.006 − 6.64*** − 0.006 − 6.55*** − 0.006 − 6.58***
AUDIT − 0.015 − 1.78* − 0.014 − 1.73* − 0.015 − 1.76*
CEOAGE 0.000 0.29 0.000 0.15 0.000 0.14
_CONS 0.088 4.34*** 0.086 4.25*** 0.086 4.24***
YEARS Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.05
F 18.33 18.71 18.05
No. of observations 10,561 10,561 10,561
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outstanding shares. BLOCK is a dummy variable set to one 
if the firm has at least one investor holding at least 5% of 
firms’ outstanding shares and zero otherwise. CEOTEN is 
CEO tenure. FCFO is a dummy variable set to one if CFO 
is a female, and zero otherwise. The results of this analysis 
are reported in Table 7 and they are qualitatively similar to 
our reported results under the main analysis.
Finally, as a robustness test investigating whether the gen-
der of CEOs affects their preference towards classification 
shifting, we create a matched sample of firms with male 
CEOs to match firms with female CEOs. Arguably, this is a 
better approach to empirically examine our hypothesis since 
firms with female CEOs represent only 3% of our sample. 
We matched a sample of firms that are similar in terms of 
all our control variables included in Model (2). In particular, 
we employ propensity score to match each FCEO firm with 
a non-FCEO firm using the nearest-neighbor method.
For 579 firms with FCEOs, we find 551 matched samples 
with male CEOs, and therefore our final sample includes 
1102 firm-year observations that we used to re-run Model 
Table 7  The association 
between female CEOs and 
classification shifting (missing 
control variables)
We estimate the parameters using the following model
UCE = β0 + β1SPI + β2FCEO + β3SOX + β4SPI × FCEO + β5SPI × SOX + β6FCEO × SOX + β7SPI × FCEO 
× SOX + Control variables
Where
FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one 
if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return 
on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV market to book value ratio meas-
ured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one 
if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, CEOTEN CEO tenure, INSTOWN 
institutional shareholders measured as the number of shares held by institutional shareholders divided by 
the number of outstanding shares, BLOCK block holders measured as a dummy variable set to one if the 
firm has at least one investor holding at least 5% of firms’ outstanding shares and zero otherwise, FCFO 
female chief financial officer measured as a dummy variable set to one if CFO is a female, and zero other-
wise, SPI special items as a percentage of sales (Special items are multiplied by − 1, where special items 
are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 where special items are income-increasing)
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
SPI 0.243 6.7*** 0.205 3.92*** 0.188 3.58***
FCEO − 0.019 − 1.74* − 0.019 − 1.74* − 0.011 − 0.38
SOX 0.016 1.13 0.016 1.13
SPI × FCEO 0.108 0.67 0.097 0.6 1.291 3.33***
SPI × SOX 0.060 1.03 0.087 1.47
FCEO × SOX − 0.011 − 0.38
SPI × FCEO × SOX − 1.447 − 3.4***
SIZE 0.005 3.4*** 0.005 3.39*** 0.005 3.39***
LEV 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.03
OCF − 0.060 − 2.47** − 0.061 − 2.49** − 0.060 − 2.45**
ROA − 0.143 − 5.14*** − 0.143 − 5.15*** − 0.144 − 5.17***
MBV − 0.003 − 5.47*** − 0.003 − 5.43*** − 0.003 − 5.43***
AUDIT − 0.006 − 0.82 − 0.006 − 0.81 − 0.006 − 0.85
CEOAGE 0.000 1.29 0.000 1.26 0.000 1.25
CEOTEN − 0.001 − 3.04*** − 0.001 − 3.04*** − 0.001 − 3.02***
INSTOWN − 0.075 − 6.69*** − 0.075 − 6.69*** − 0.074 − 6.65***
BLOCK 0.007 4.96*** 0.007 4.94*** 0.007 4.89***
FCFO 0.004 0.62 0.004 0.63 0.004 0.64
_CONS 0.050 2.82*** 0.050 2.82*** 0.050 2.83***
YEARS Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
F 16.8 16.35 15.79
No. of observations 15,976 15,976 15,976
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(2). The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8 and 
they still support our main finding that SOX has significantly 
influenced FCEOs towards classification shifting.
Further Analysis: Other Earnings Management 
Methods
Earnings can be managed through financial reporting deci-
sions in a number of ways, including straightforward fraud, 
AEM, REM and/or classification shifting, but, so far, our 
analyses have focussed on classification shifting. If the risk-
aversion theory holds, we expect to see more female CEOs 
shift from AEM in the post-SOX era. In addition, the extant 
research (i.e., Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Cohen et al. 2008; 
Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006) suggests that the 
post-SOX era is characterized by high REM. That is, one 
might argue that female CEOs might have adopted alterna-
tive earnings management methods—(i.e., REM)—in the 
post-SOX era. Female CEOs might prefer REM for many 
reasons, but most importantly, it is not subject to much scru-
tiny by external auditors and monitors. In addition, real busi-
ness decisions constitute a significant part of monotonous 
business decisions, and so it is difficult to distinguish them 
from normal business decisions (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
Roychowdhury 2006). That is, REM has lesser chance of 
being detected than either classification shifting or AEM. 
Consequently, if the risk-aversion theory holds, we might 
find an increase in REM usage in firms with female CEOs in 
post-SOX. Therefore, as a further test, we repeat our analy-
sis using alternative measures of managers’ opportunistic 
Table 8  The association 
between female CEOs and 
classification shifting (matched 
sample)
We estimate the parameters using the following model
UCE = β0 + β1SPI + β2FCEO + β3SOX + β4SPI × FCEO + β5SPI × SOX + β6FCEO × SOX + β7SPI × FCEO 
× SOX + Control variables
Where
FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one 
if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return 
on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV market to book value ratio meas-
ured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one 
if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age, SPI special items as a percentage 
of sales (Special items are multiplied by − 1, where special items are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 
where special items are income-increasing)
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
SPI 0.529 2.7*** 0.722 2.64*** 0.071 0.21
FCEO − 0.019 − 1.37 − 0.019 − 1.36 0.045 1.5
SOX 0.070 1.08 0.101 1.55
SPI × FCEO − 0.093 − 0.4 − 0.078 − 0.34 1.225 2.68***
SPI × SOX − 0.268 − 1.01 0.616 1.65*
FCEO × SOX − 0.082 − 2.41**
SPI × FCEO × SOX − 1.739 − 3.31***
SIZE 0.000 0.01 0.000 0 0.000 0.08
LEV 0.015 1.58 0.015 1.51 0.015 1.62
OCF − 0.083 − 0.9 − 0.081 − 0.88 − 0.044 − 0.48
ROA 0.015 0.15 0.016 0.16 − 0.013 − 0.13
MBV − 0.006 − 1.6 − 0.006 − 1.53 − 0.006 − 1.57
AUDIT − 0.002 − 0.09 − 0.004 − 0.15 − 0.001 − 0.05
CEOAGE 0.000 0.44 0.000 0.42 0.000 0.34
_CONS 0.005 0.07 0.009 0.12 − 0.017 − 0.23
YEARS Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.04 0.04 0.05
F 2.37 2.33 2.72
No. of observations 1102 1102 1102
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behavior, namely AEM and REM,14 where AEM is the abso-
lute value of the residual from adjusted Jones (1991) model 
as follows:
where WCA refers to working capital accruals measured as 
the (change in current assets − change in cash) − (change in 
current liabilities − change in the current portion of long-
term debt). AT refer to total assets. We measure Adj_SALES 
as the difference between change in sales and changes in 
accounts receivable. In addition, following Ball and Shiva-
kumar (2006) and Athanasakou et al. (2011), we control for 
ΔOCF and Neg_OCF. ΔOCF refers to the changes in operat-
ing cash flows (ΔOCF). Neg_OCF, is a dummy variable set 
to 1 when ΔOCF is less than 0 and 0 otherwise.
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Cheng et al. 
(2015), we use two proxies for REM, namely REM1 and 
REM2,15 where REM1 is (UN_DEX + UN_OCF) and 
REM2 is (UN_DEX + UN_PROD). Following Roychowd-
hury (2006), UN_DEX, UN_OCF and UN_PROD are the 
residual from the following three equations run annually for 
each industry.
where DISEX is discretionary expenses measured as the sum 
of selling, general and administrative, R&D and advertising 
expenses. ∆Sales is the change in sales. PROD is the sum of 
both change in inventory and cost of goods sold.16
(4)
WCA
i,t∕ATi,t−1 = 훽0 + 훽11∕ATi,t−1 + 훽2Adj_SALESi,t∕
AT
i,t−1 + 훽3ΔOCFi,t∕ATi,t−1
+ 훽4Neg_OCFi,t + 훽5ΔOCFi,t∕ATi,t−1
× Neg_OCF
i,t + 휀it,
(5)
DEX
t
∕AT
t−1 = 훽0 + 훽11∕ATt−1 + 훽2Salest∕ATt−1 + eit,
(6)
OCF
t
∕AT
t−1 = 훽0 + 훽11∕ATt−1 + 훽2Salest∕ATt−1
+ 훽3ΔSalest∕ATt−1 + eit,
(7)
PROD
t
∕AT
t−1 = 훽0 + 훽11∕ATt−1 + 훽2Salest∕ATt−1
+ 훽3ΔSalest∕ATt−1 + 훽4ΔSalest−1∕
AT
t−1 + eit,
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 9. For 
AEM, contrary to our expectation, the sign of FCEO is nega-
tive, but insignificant, suggesting that there are no significant 
differences between female and male CEOs towards AEM 
in the pre-SOX era. However, the negative sign of FCEO 
provide a moderate support for the fact that female CEOs 
are less likely to engage in AEM. Similarly, the coefficient 
of FCEO × SOX is negative, but insignificant, demonstrating 
that the SOX has a moderate impact on female CEOs behav-
ior towards AEM. Interestingly, while our results reported 
under columns 2 and 3 suggest that female CEOs (FCEO) 
were less likely to engage in REM (REM1 and REM2) in the 
pre-SOX era, they are more likely to participate in REM in 
the post-SOX era; probably because SOX has made it costly 
to engage in financial reporting decisions-based earnings 
management. All these suggest that female directors appear 
to be more risk-averse, but not necessarily more ethical than 
their male counterparts are.
Conclusion
Traditionally, the number of women serving in senior corpo-
rate executive roles has been low (Carter et al. 2003, 2010). 
However, concerted national and international governance, 
regulatory and legal reforms, as well as positive initiatives 
that have been pursued worldwide over the past three dec-
ades have helped in bringing about a steady increase in the 
number and percentage of women currently occupying such 
senior corporate executive roles (Adams 2016; Adams and 
Ferreira 2009; Srinidhi et al. 2011). Much of such posi-
tive reform is driven by theoretical and empirical evidence, 
which suggests that gender-diverse boards not only enhance 
corporate performance/value by improving independence, 
monitoring, advisory capacity and resources (Carter et al. 
2003, 2010; Gul et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2014; Shrader et al. 
1997), but also reduce corporate fraud and wrong-doing 
through enhancement in risk-aversion and ethical orienta-
tion (Ho et al. 2015; Palvia et al. 2015; Peni and Vahamaa 
2010; Sun et al. 2017). For example and of close relevance 
to our current study, the findings of several studies suggest 
that female directors are associated with: (i) more conserva-
tive financial reporting (Ho et al. 2015; Palvia et al. 2015), 
(ii) higher accounting quality (Barua et al. 2010b), and 
(iii) lower fraudulent financial reporting (Sun et al. 2017), 
amongst others.
A major empirical research question that has been inves-
tigated less often, however, is whether women executives are 
more ethical or risk-averse than their male counterparts are. 
A priori, if women are more risk-averse than ethical, then, 
we conjecture that with the possibility of facing costly legal 
action, they are more likely to shift to a more subtle, less 
risky and difficult-to-detect corporate activity (Abernathy 
14 We thank anonymous reviewers for pointing out this issue to us.
15 Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Cheng 
et al. (2015) noted that some activities might lead to both abnormally 
high production costs and abnormally low OCF. Therefore, the cur-
rent study does not combine the three components in order to avoid 
potential double counting.
16 For ease of interpretation and following Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), we multiply the residuals from Eqs. 5 and 6 by negative one. 
That is, high UN_DEX and UN_OCF is consistent with high proba-
bility that a firm has cut their discretionary expenses or offering more 
price discount.
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et al. 2014; Alfonso et al. 2015), but one that is nonethe-
less equally un-ethical (Zalata and Roberts 2016, 2017). The 
opposite may hold if women are genuinely more ethical than 
men. The 2002 SOX Act offers a unique empirical setting to 
test these propositions. This is because since the financial 
scandals in large companies at the beginning of this century 
and the passage of the SOX Act, CEOs are more likely to 
employ sophisticated earnings management methods that are 
less likely to be detected compared with accruals (Cohen 
et al. 2008, 2010; McNichols 2000; Stubben 2010; Zang 
2012). One of these methods is classification shifting that 
has been shown to be a viable earnings management method 
used by firms constrained from using AEM (Zalata and 
Roberts 2016, 2017). However, we know surprisingly very 
little about whether CEOs’ gender affects their preference 
when it comes to managing earnings using the classification 
shifting approach. However, and widely known to be more 
risk-averse (Croson and Gneezy 2009), female CEOs, argu-
ably, would be equally demotivated to employ both AEM 
and classification-shifting earnings management approaches 
if they are both risky and costly to engage in. However, it 
is not clear how they will behave morally and ethically in 
dilemma situations, whereby earnings management method, 
such as classification shifting, that has a lower detection cost 
is available to be used. This is arguably an important empiri-
cal research question given the fact that most firms voluntar-
ily disclose pro-forma earnings and most investors use this 
information in their investment decisions (Chen et al. 2012).
Consequently and using a sample of US firms over the 
period from 1992 to 2014, we examine the extent to which 
the gender of a firm’s CEO affects the level of earnings 
management by classification shifting. Our findings suggest 
that the pre-SOX period was characterized by high levels 
of classification shifting in firms with either female CEOs 
or male CEOs, although our results suggest further that it 
was more pervasive in firms with female CEOs. By contrast, 
our results suggest that in the post-SOX era, female CEOs 
(as more risk-averse executives compared with male CEOs) 
significantly decreased their usage of classification shifting; 
therefore, demonstrating that the strong legal environment 
appears to have affected their behavior towards earnings 
management. Given this, our evidence appears to support the 
proposition that differences between female and male CEOs 
in financial reporting decisions are driven by the fact that 
female CEOs are more risk-averse than their male rivals, and 
not necessarily because they are more ethically sensitive. 
Thus, our findings appear to offer more empirical support for 
our risk-aversion theory compared with our ethical theory. 
Table 9  The association 
between female CEOs and 
accruals-based and real earnings 
management
We estimate the parameters using the following model
EM = β0 + β1FCEO + β2SOX + β3FCEO × SOX + Control variables
Where
FCEO indicator variable set to one if CEO is female and zero otherwise, SOX indicator variable set to one 
if firm-year observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise, SIZE the natural log of total assets, LEV the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity, OCF cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets, ROA return 
on assets measured as net income divided by average total assets, MBV market to book value ratio meas-
ured as market capitalization divided by book value of common equity, AUDIT indicator variable set to one 
if a Big4 auditor audits firm, and zero otherwise, CEOAGE CEO age
*Significance at 0.10, **significance at 0.05, ***significance at 0.01
Variables AEM REM1 REM2
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
FCEO − 0.006 − 0.81 − 0.064 − 2.95*** − 0.115 − 2.91***
SOX 0.027 7.09*** − 0.021 − 1.76* 0.054 2.5**
FCEO × SOX − 0.001 − 0.07 0.062 2.53** 0.084 1.87*
SIZE − 0.006 − 15.47*** 0.014 11.68*** 0.035 16.21***
LEV − 0.004 − 10.25*** 0.017 12.62*** 0.034 14***
OCF 0.023 3.32 − 1.414 − 64.65*** − 0.687 − 17.2***8
ROA − 0.085 − 13.47*** 0.510 25.41*** 0.068 1.86*
MBV 0.003 16.44*** − 0.012 − 20.62*** − 0.024 − 23.4***
AUDIT − 0.011 − 4.94*** 0.022 3.22*** 0.057 4.51***
CEOAGE 0.000 − 6.72*** 0.000 2.54** 0.001 2.84***
_CONS 0.109 23.26*** − 0.017 − 1.16 − 0.232 − 8.62***
YEARS Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.08 0.26 0.09
F 63.28 235.23 70.99
No. of observations 21,034 19,959 19,959
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It should be noted, however, that our findings only imply 
that in dilemmatic situations, female CEOs risk-aversion 
instincts are more likely to take precedence over their ethical 
instincts, and thereby making female CEOs to be relatively 
more risk-averse than ethical. Nevertheless and on compara-
tive basis, female CEOs are, on average, both more ethical 
and risk-averse compared with their male counterparts.
The findings have implications for auditors, boards of 
directors, investors, policy-makers and regulatory authori-
ties, who are interested in the quality of reported earnings. 
For example, our findings have implications for boards of 
directors in terms of informing their decisions regarding 
CEOs appointments. Similarly, for auditors, investors and 
regulators, our findings suggest that they should consider 
not only the gender of CEOs, but also the legal environ-
ment as factors that can influence the propensity for CEOs 
to manage earnings.
Finally and although our study is robust and important, 
its limitations need to be explicitly acknowledged. First, it 
is widely known that the quality of external and internal 
corporate governance environment can influence the extent 
to which CEOs are able to manage earnings. Although we 
have controlled for some governance variables in our cur-
rent analysis, they are not exhaustive due to data limitations. 
Future researchers may, therefore, be able to improve upon 
our findings by including extensive internal (e.g., board 
structures and gender diversity) and external (e.g., analyst 
following and media coverage) governance structures. Sec-
ond, several studies suggest (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010) that the 
motivations for CFOs to engage in earnings management 
tend to be different from those of CEOs. Our study, however, 
focuses on CEOs and although we have tried to control for 
the gender of CFOs, due to limited data, our test seems to 
lack full statistical power. Future research, therefore, may 
seek to replicate our study by focusing mainly on the gender 
of the CFO, as improved data becomes available. Further 
and although we have repeated our analysis using alternative 
earnings management techniques, such as REM approach, 
future researchers may be able to offer further new insights 
by conducting a study that compares different techniques, 
such as fraud, AEM, REM and classification shifting meth-
ods concurrently. Finally, while our findings suggest that 
female CEOs are relatively more risk-averse than ethical, 
readers should be cautious about this interpretation. In par-
ticular and on the other hand, our findings might equally 
imply that female CEOs did not view classification shifting 
through the lens of ethical behavior until after the frauds, 
such as Enron that led to the SOX legislation in the early 
2000s occurred. If women changed their reporting behavior 
once they started to perceive classification shifting as an 
ethical behavior, then, differences in ethics between men and 
women could equally explain our findings. Thus, our find-
ings may be explained by the ethical theory as well. Future 
research may, therefore, be able to improve upon our analy-
sis through an investigation that focuses on both different 
risk and ethics-oriented empirical settings by employing all 
reasonably conceivable earnings management techniques. 
Such an approach may offer more conclusive explanations 
to the ethics versus risk-aversion puzzle.
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